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NOTES
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT'S LENGTHENING
SHADOW OVER
FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL v.
HALDERMAN
The eleventh amendment' immunizes states from suits commenced by

private individual citizens in federal court. While this immunity may be lifted
for certain suits based on federal statutory or constitutional law, the Supreme
Court decided in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman2 that

eleventh amendment immunity precludes a private individual from seeking
injunctive relief in federal court against state officials based on state law
claims. By denying litigants access to federal court for state law claims, the

Supreme Court has succeeded in shifting private suits against states from
federal to state courts. The Pennhurst decision purportedly allocated only

state law claims to state courts, but the inconvenience to plaintiffs of
mounting two suits for separate federal and state claims will lead many

plaintiffs to bring all of their claims together in state court, thereby losing
the benefits of the federal forum. In addition, by artfully combining Pennhurst's reading of the eleventh amendment with the federal doctrine of

1. "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign States." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Eleventh amendment scholarship has flourished in the past decade. See M. REDIsH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF POWER 139-68 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

129-43 (1978); Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U.

COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Field, Part One];
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional
Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Field,
Part Two]; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Liberman, State
Sovereign Immunity in Suits to Enforce FederalRights, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 195; Nowak, The
Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the
History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Orth,
The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power,
1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423; Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst
Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered
Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293 (1980).
2. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
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abstention, state defendants3 will have a tool for shifting many federal law

claims from federal to state courts.

3. The term "state defendant" shall be used in this Note to describe defendants that are
states or commonwealths of the United States. Territories are states for the purposes of the
eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Camacho v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450 F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R.
1978) (eleventh amendment applied to Puerto Rico).
The eleventh amendment definition of a "state" may extend to state officials and state
agencies. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984)
(state officials and state school included in eleventh amendment protection). For an agency
to enjoy the state's eleventh amendment immunity, the federal court must determine that the
state is a real party in interest by virtue of the agency's presence on the record. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). This determination is made
on the basis of two considerations: (1) whether the agency is an "alter ego" of the state,
and (2) whether the state has a fiscal stake in the judgment.
Before applying the eleventh amendment to bar a suit, the federal court should find, after
weighing all the applicable factors, that an agency is an "arm" or "alter ego" of the state.
The principal case illustrating this weighing process is Krisel v. Duran, 258 F. Supp. 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042 (1968). The
Krisel court determined that the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico was an
alter ego of Puerto Rico because the state would pay any judgment against it and because it
served a "governmental" function; thus, a private suit against the Administration was barred
in federal court. 258 F. Supp. at 855; see also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977) (Court examined Ohio state law to determine that Board
of Education was not an "arm of the state," and therefore not immune under eleventh
amendment); Hall v. Medical College, 742 F.2d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 1984) (court examined Ohio
state law to determine that medical school was an "arm of the state" and therefore immune
from suit); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 16 (D. Or.
1964) (identified various factors relevant to determining whether an agency is an "arm of the
state"), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965).
These cases suggest several factors for determining whether an agency is an alter ego of a
state: (1) whether the defendant performs a government function, compare Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (7th Cir. 1982) (prison administration was immune from suit
because operating a state prison is a state function) with Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293, 296-97
(3d Cir. 1960) (because Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission does not perform a government
function, Commission did not share in state's eleventh amendment immunity), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 817 (1961); (2) whether state law describes the agency as an arm of the state, compare
Fouche v. Jeckyll Island State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1983) (Georgia
statute described Authority as a state agency) with Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519
F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1975) (Texas statute and case law revealed that public junior colleges
were independent from state and not immune under the eleventh amendment); and (3) whether
the agency functions autonomously from the state, see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 718-21 (1973) (state corporate body, with capacity to sue and be sued, did not share state's
eleventh amendment immunity).
The state must also have a fiscal stake in the judgment before the eleventh amendment will
be applied to bar the action. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). If a state will
contribute to a defendant in a judgment for damages, then the suit is considered "against the
state," and barred by the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
668-672 (1974) (rejected theories for imposing money damages on state defendants). This fiscal
consideration, however, is not independent of the first requirement that an agency be an arm
of the state. A bare indemnification agreement between a state and a defendant does not by
itself immunize the defendant. See McAdoo v. Lane, 564 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(discussing eleventh amendment analysis of state indemnity statutes).
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Consideration of Pennhurst's effect on federal jurisdiction over state
defendants raises doubts about the correctness of the Pennhurst decision. In
Pennhurst, the Court succeeded in diminishing the federal judicial role in
the regulation of state governmental affairs. The same result could have
been attained by resorting to the federal equitable rules of comity. First, the
Supreme Court could have utilized the law of pendent jurisdiction to defer
to sensitive state policies. Second, the Court could have abstained from
hearing the case in order to avoid a conflict with state administration of
state law. Both of these discretionary doctrines have the advantage of
flexibility. In contrast, Pennhurst functions clumsily and needlessly biases
the law of federal jurisdiction against private plaintiffs with state and federal
law claims against states.
I.

A.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Federal Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment

The United States Constitution authorizes a dual court system. Article III
6
4
creates the federal courts; article I, section 10 and the tenth amendment,
by implication, reserve to the states the power to administer their own
courts.7 In most cases, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction

over claims based on federal law.' Conversely, federal courts may decide
Political subdivisions of the states are usually not considered arms of the state for purposes
of the eleventh amendment. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658,
690 n.54 (1978) (municipalities do not share in eleventh amendment immunity); Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (eleventh amendment does
not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations); Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S.
218, 228, 233 (1964) (school boards are not protected by the eleventh amendment). But see
Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188, 284 n.41 (D. Utah 1982) (school district immune under
eleventh amendment from damage suit), aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 1395 (1985); Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(in dictum court stated that interests of comity and federalism generally suggest that municipalities
should be protected from monetary liability in federal suits).
In Pennhurst, some of the defendants were county officials. 104 S. Ct. at 904. Interestingly,
the Court dismissed the suit against the county officials. The suit against them was not dismissed
on eleventh amendment grounds, but instead because the Court believed that a federal injunction
against the county officials alone would be an inadequate remedy for the plaintiff class. Id. at
920-21. Professor Shapiro notes that this aspect of Pennhurst portends an extension of eleventh
amendment immunity to local governments. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81-82.
4. U.S. CONST. art. III.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
6. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend
X.
7. Neither article 1, which directly prohibits certain conduct by the states, nor any other
section of the Constitution prohibits states from establishing courts. The tenth amendment
reserves to states the right to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2 (references to state courts).
8. The standard governing concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over federal claims
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state law claims if federal subject-matter jurisdiction is satisfied between the

parties, which is generally achieved through diversity jurisdiction. 9 Questions
concerning the allocation of authority between federal and state courts to

hear cases falling under both courts' jurisdiction have resulted in sharp
controversies between the two systems.10
The friction between state and federal courts is relieved to some extent by
the fact that federal courts are forums of limited jurisdiction." Federal courts
are empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the

United States, as limited by article 11112 and as framed by jurisdictional
grants from Congress. 3 Most state courts, on the other hand, are courts of
general jurisdiction, which may hear any type of action, unless specifically
was enunciated in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (state
courts may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over federal causes of action "absent provision
by Congress to the contrary or disabling incompatability between the federal claim and statecourt adjudication").
9. Federal courts are compelled in most instances to apply substantive state law in diversity
cases, that is, in those cases in which the judicial power of the United States extends "to
controversies . . . between Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This rule
compelling federal courts to follow state law was formulated in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision
Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678, 701-05 (1976) (discussing the development of the
Erie doctrine).
10. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 301-02 (1964) (right of
association controversy reached Supreme Court for third time due to Alabama state courts'
unwillingness to conform with Supreme Court's prior opinions); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816) (Court's second decree correcting Virginia Supreme Court's
judgment definitively asserted Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over controversies arising
under federal law). See generally Blaustein & Ferguson, Avoidance, Evasion, and Delay, in
THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 96 (T. Becker ed. 1969) (discussion of legal attempts to avoid desegregation); Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court
Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 260, 283 (1972)
(state court evasion of Supreme Court mandates significantly increased in 1960's); Schneider,
State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates: A Reconsideration of the
Evidence, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 191, 192 (1973) (state courts often ignore, repudiate, or narrowly
construe Supreme Court decisions).
11. "Limited jurisdiction" is jurisdiction which can be exercised only under circumstances
outlined by statute or constitution. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (5th ed. 1979). For a general
discussion of the principles of federal limited jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 22-26 (4th ed. 1983).
12. The pertinent portion of article Ill reads as follows:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
party;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
13. Aside from constitutional limitations, federal jurisdiction is exercised "with such Ex-
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prohibited by constitution or statute.

4

Because a federal court would un-

constitutionally invade authority reserved to state courts by entertaining cases

beyond its jurisdiction,

5

parties cannot confer authority on a federal court

to hear a state law case that does not satisfy federal subject matter jurisdic-

tion. 16
Beyond federal subject matter jurisdiction, however, there are two federal
equitable doctrines that influence federal judicial discretion to hear cases

involving state law claims. The first of these doctrines is pendent jurisdiction,
under which a federal court may hear state law claims between parties
invoking federal jurisdiction, 7 if the state and federal claims are closely

related.' 8 Pendent jurisdiction facilitates the use of federal courts by allowing
litigants to bring all of their state and federal claims together in one federal
suit. The leading Supreme Court decision on the law of pendent jurisdiction
is United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.' I Gibbs overruled a prior decision which
had permitted federal courts to hear pendent state claims only when they

ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. I11,
§ 2;
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal district courts have original jurisdiction in civil
actions arising under federal law); id. § 1332 (federal district courts have original jurisdiction
over most civil actions between diverse parties); id. § 1333 (federal district courts have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, over admiralty, maritime, and prize cases); id. § 1338
(federal district courts have original, exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright cases).
14. For example, Illinois circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See ILL. CONST.
art. 6, § 9 ("Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justicable matters except when
the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction .... ").Illinois juvenile courts,
however, are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §
702-1 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
15. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 11,at 22 (federal courts are empowered to hear only
those cases within the jurisdictional grant defined by the United States Constitution and statutes).
16. Id. at 23. But see Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REV.
49 (1961) (seminal article that criticizes the subject matter jurisdictional bar as inconsistent with
common law).
17. A federal question is an issue involving some form of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1982) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); see also supra note 12 (similar
jurisdictional language found in article III).
18. It is anomolous that while federal courts are forums of limited jurisdiction, see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 22-26, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to
entertain claims not expressly within their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Comment, Aldinger v. Howard
and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 134-35 (1977) (discussion of decisions
permitting expansion of federal statutory jurisdiction). The conundrum is resolved by an
expansive interpretation of article Ill's jurisdictional grant, which can be read to include state
claims as part of the federal "case or controversy" to which the claims are pendent. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
19. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Gibbs, the plaintiff, alleged that United Mine Workers organized
a strike at his coal mine which caused him to lose both his job and the income he received
from hauling contracts. Gibbs claimed that the actions violated the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982) (the federal bar on secondary boycotts), as well as the Tennessee
common law tort of conspiracy. The Supreme Court permitted Gibbs to proceed with both of
these claims together in federal court. 383 U.S. at 725.
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arose from the same discrete set of events as the federal claims. 20 This "cause
of action" standard was dismissed by the Gibbs Court as "unnecessarily
grudging, ' 21 suggesting that the stringency of the test belied the policies of
judicial economy and convenience that pendent jurisdiction was intended to
promote.
Gibbs introduced a liberal standard, permitting the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction whenever the state claim shares a "common nucleus of operative
facts" with a substantial federal claim, 22 if the plaintiff would "ordinarily
be expected" to bring the claims in one suit. 23 Gibbs also furnished federal
district courts with considerable discretion in deciding when to employ the
doctrine. Courts are to be guided by the policies that underlie pendent
24
jurisdiction: judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants.
Federal courts should dismiss pendent claims if the state issues substantially
predominate in a suit, if the state law is uncertain, or if comity otherwise
25
warrants dismissal.
The second jurisdictional doctrine of importance in understanding Pennhurst is federal abstention. Under abstention, a federal court may decline
to proceed in a case otherwise within its subject-matter jurisdiction if it
concludes that a state forum would be especially appropriate for that case.
This doctrine, created in the 1941 Supreme Court case of Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co., 2 6 has spawned several subspecies; 27 two of these subspecies
bear a special relationship to the Pennhurst case.
20. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933) (authorized pendent jurisdiction only
in situations where state and federal claims arose from same "cause of action").
21. 383 U.S. at 725.
22. Id.; see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-43 (1974) (substantial federal claim
is any claim not devoid of merit).
23. 383 U.S. at 725. Commentators ordinarily view these two requirements as coterminous:
to satisfy one is generally to satisfy both. See, e.g., Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal
Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 245, 263 (1980)
(suggests that Hum Court did not consider absence of common facts to be dispositive of
pendent power issue).
24. 383 U.S. at 726.
25. Gibbs counsels that, as a matter of comity, pendent jurisdiction should not be exercised
when state issues predominate a case or if a comprehensive remedy is sought on the basis of
state law. 383 U.S. at 726; see infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
Comity is the principle by which courts of one jurisdiction will defer to the authority of

another, not as a matter of obligation but out of respect.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

242 (5th

ed. 1979). In the course of this Note, comity will refer to the deference federal courts give to
state judicial authority. See generally Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts,
60 N.C.L. REV. 59, 61-64 (1981) (outlining context in which abstention doctrine evolved).
26. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
27. Commentators differ as to the number of separate categories of abstention. This Note
will refer to the four categories identified by Professor Charles Wright. See C. WRiOHT, supra
note 11, at 302-19. These categories are based upon different policy considerations. First,
Pullman abstention is ordered to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question if the case
can be decided on the basis of state law. Second, Burford abstention, based upon Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), see infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text, is ordered to
prevent unwarranted federal interference in state public policy. Third, Thibodaux abstention,
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The first subspecies of abstention, announced by the Supreme Court in

Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,28 authorizes federal courts to dismiss29 claims when
federal adjudication of the state law questions in the case would disrupt
state efforts to establish and enforce important public policies. The policy

behind Burford abstention is widely accepted as a form of federal comity,
leaving to the states the uncontested power to administer and review their
own policies.30 The scope of Burford abstention in practice is elastic. The

Supreme Court's decision to abstain in the original Burford case was based
upon several factors: (1) the suit originated as a challenge to an administrative
order; (2) the subject matter was of peculiarly local interest; (3) the state
had an intricate review procedure governing the local policy; and (4) federal

intervention would interfere with that local policy. 3' In a subsequent Burford
type case, however, the Court ordered the district court to abstain without

discussing all of the elements that provided the basis for abstention in
Burford.32 Most commentators favor a narrowly-drawn Burford doctrine, to

formulated in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), is
ordered to allow state courts to resolve ambiguities in state law. Finally, Colorado River
abstention, based upon Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976), see infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text, is ordered to promote judicial economy
when simultaneous federal and state suits are litigating the same issues.
28. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
29. In Burford, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims because Burfordtype abstention is premised on the belief that any intervention by a federal court in a particular
controversy will unnecessarily disrupt state policy. Id. at 334; see Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1976); see also Construction
Aggregates Corp. v. Rivera de Vicenty, 573 F.2d 86, 89-93 (1st Cir. 1978) (Burford-type
abstention ordered). Even after dismissing a case, a federal court ordering Burford abstention
may retain jurisdiction and, if necessary in the face of state court recalcitrance, reclaim the
case. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (abstention ordered
to allow New Mexico courts to decide a question of water law; however, federal jurisdiction
was retained, to ensure a just disposition of the case).
30. The Burford opinion directly raises this comity interest: "[Q]uestions of regulation of
the [oil] industry by the State administrative agency . . . so clearly involve basic problems of
Texas policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas courts the first
opportunity to consider them." 319 U.S. at 332.
31. In Burford, the Texas Railroad Commission granted the defendant, Burford, a license
to drill oil wells. Sun Oil filed suit in federal district court seeking judicial review, on state law
and due process grounds, of the Texas Railroad Commission order granting Burford a permit
to drill four wells. Id. at 317. The Court unanimously concluded that the district court should
abstain and dismiss the case. Id. at 334. The Court cited the special administrative and judicial
procedures under Texas law to regulate oil and gas drilling and emphasized the importance to
Texas of formulating energy policy. Id. at 326.
The Court determined that federal interference with the Texas policy would result in undue
disruption and confusion. Id. at 327-28. Centralized and knowledgeable regulation of drilling
policy was found to be necessary because each production decision had subtle economic and
production effects on all producers. Id. at 319-24. The Court thought that federal intervention
in this review system might unravel the fine fabric of compromises laid down by local decision
makers. Id. at 327.
32. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). The Commission denied the railroad's request to discontinue some of its less lucrative operations.
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be invoked by the courts only in cases where the federal interest is minimal,
or where the court's intervention into the controversy threatens to seriously
disrupt local policy. 3 Most lower courts have adopted the same cautious
stance,34 but a substantial number of lower court opinions reflect a less
rigorous analysis.3 5
The Supreme Court recognized a second subspecies of abstention in Colorado River Water District v. United States.3 6 The Colorado River doctrine
allows a federal court to dismiss or stay37 federal actions that are identical

Subsequently, the railroad challenged the order in federal court. Id. at 343. The Supreme
Court, in dismissing the claims, emphasized the local importance of railroad regulation. Id. at
347. While there was a state administrative review agency, as in Burford, the Court apparently
placed no significance on that fact. Nor did the case present the regulatory intricacies posed in
Burford.
33. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note I, at 246 (Burford abstention only appropriate in limited
situations when substantial federal interest present); Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts
in Suits Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The Scope of the Burford Doctrine, 46
U. Cm. L. REv. 971, 1005 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Scope of Burford] (Burford abstention justified only where federal intervention threatens to substantially disrupt state
policies).
34. Burford abstention has been generally limited to cases in which the subject matter is
highly complex and of local concern, see, e.g., Santa Fe Land Improvement v. City of Chula
Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1979) (complicated land use ordinance), and in which the
state or municipality has a specialized forum for review for the controversy, see, e.g., Beck v.
California, 479 F. Supp. 392, 400 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (staying federal question case in deference
to a complex regulatory review program governing coastline ownership). Usually courts refuse
to grant Burford abstention unless both of these conditions are satisfied. See, e.g., ADACascade Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, 720 F.2d 897, 903-06 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Burford not applicable unless complete state regulatory scheme would be disrupted by federal
adjudication of controversy and state has a specialized forum for reviewing controversy);
Educational Serv., Inc., v. Maryland State Bd. for Higher Educ., 710 F.2d 170, 173 (4th Cir.
1983) (mere local importance and regulation of education does not warrant abstention from
case stemming from teacher certification process); Pari Mutuel Clerks Union, Local 328 v. Fair
Grounds Corp., 703 F.2d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 1983) (Burford not applicable where state does
not "extensively" regulate racetrack workers' collective bargaining).
35. See, e.g., DiPerri v. FAA, 671 F.2d 54, 59 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1982) (local interest in airport
noise regulation takes precedence over federal interest in adjudicating state claims; Burford
abstention appropriate); Moos v. Wells, 585 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (federal
court abstained from adjudicating claim, which rested on state and municipal housing laws, in
view of local interest in housing); Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 573 F.
Supp. 443, 451 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (Burford abstention proper because state had an administrative
agency which managed state end of Medicaid program); Reynolds v. State Bar, 524 F. Supp.
1003, 1007 (D. Mont. 1981) (court abstained from considering state claims touching on activities
of state bar); see Comment, The Scope of Burford, supra note 33, at 980 n.53, 981 n.54 and
cases cited therein.
36. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The lower federal courts, especially in the Second Circuit,
recognized the Colorado River doctrine before the case was decided. See, e.g., P. Beiersdorf
& Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1951) (trademark infringement action stayed
pending termination of a prior state action); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir.
1949) (shareholders' derivative suit properly stayed on basis of state autonomy or the convenience
of the parties).
37. A succeeding case, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
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to proceedings that are simultaneously pending in state court. Unlike Burford
abstention, Colorado River abstention is not invoked to promote comity
between state and federal courts." Instead, it provides for judicial economy
and convenience to the litigants by centralizing the litigation in the state
forum.3 9 Owing to the "unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise
the jurisdiction given them,"' 4 federal courts may invoke this particular
doctrine only under "exceptional circumstances, ' ' 4 1 such as those the Court
found in the Colorado River case.4 2 A subsequent Supreme Court decision,
Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,43 explained some
of the circumstances that favor Colorado River abstention: (1) when state
law provides the principle rule of decision;" (2) when the state forum acquired

U.S. 1 (1983), specifically declined to chart a preferred course between a dismissal and a stay
in Colorado River abstention cases. Id. at 28.
38. Justice Brennan, who authored the Colorado River opinion, expressly maintained that
dismissal in such cases was not abstention. 424 U.S. at 820. Abstention, according to Justice
Brennan, is governed by principles of comity. Id. at 814-15. Colorado River, in contrast, is
governed by the convenience of the courts and the litigants. Id. at 817-20. Justice Brennan
drew this distinction to emphasize that dismissals will rarely be permissible under Colorado
River. Id. at 817-19. Whether it is a doctrine of comity or convenience, a federal court following
Colorado River stays or dismisses a case in favor of state adjudication. Hence, for simplicity's
sake, Colorado River shall be handled in this Note as an abstention doctrine.
39. Id. at 818.
40. Id. at 817.
41. Id. at 818 (circumstances for Colorado River abstention, "though exceptional, do
nevertheless exist").
42. In Colorado River, the United States sued 1000 water users in Colorado in federal
court, under federal and Colorado law, to adjudicate the reserved water rights claimed on
behalf of itself and certain Indian tribes. The federal government invoked the district court's
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982). 424 U.S. at 805. One of the 22 federal suit
defendants subsequently sought to join the United States in state court proceedings to adjudicate
all of the federal and state claims together. Id. at 806. Joinder was achieved under the McCarran
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982), which provides for United States consent to joinder in
state proceedings to adjudicate water rights. 424 U.S. at 802-03. The federal district court
dismissed the United States suit, in deference to the state proceeding. The Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal, based on the following considerations: (I) the McCarran Amendment
supports a federal policy of centralizing litigation of water rights in a single state forum, id.
at 819-20; (2) the absence of prior federal proceedings in the district court, id. at 820; (3) the
intensive local interest in water rights, id.; (4) the remoteness of the federal and state courthouses,
id.; and (5) the current participation of the United States in the parallel state proceedings, id.
43. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Moses H. Cone, the hospital filed an action in North Carolina
state court seeking a judgment declaring that it had no liability under a contract it had made
with Mercury. Id. at 7. Mercury subsequently filed a federal action seeking an order to compel
arbitration with the hospital under the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). The federal
district court stayed Mercury's suit, since the federal and state suits involved the identical issue
of the arbitrability of the contract. 460 U.S. at 7.
The Supreme Court reversed the stay. Id. at 29. After holding that the stay was an appealable
order, the Court held that the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River controlled,
and that the case did not rise to the circumstances appropriate for dismissal. Id. at 10-11;
see infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
44. 460 U.S. at 23-26. The controlling law in Moses H. Cone was the Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), which supported federal jurisdiction in this case.
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jurisdiction in the suit first; 45 (3) when the state court acquired jurisdiction

over the res or property upon which the suit is based; 46 (4) when state
adjudication will adequately protect the litigants' rights; 47 (5) when a single

state proceeding is substantially more convenient than two suits; 4 and (6)
when a single state proceeding would avoid piecemeal litigation.4 9 Since the

Court decided Moses H. Cone, most lower federal courts have applied the
Colorado River doctrine very conservatively.50
In contrast to the abstention doctrine, the eleventh amendment5 ' is a manda-

tory bar precluding federal courts from entertaining suits between private individual plaintiffs and state defendants. It resembles the common law rule of
sovereign immunity, 2 which dictates that a sovereign may not be sued without
45. 460 U.S. at 21-22. The case was filed in state court first, which ordinarily would support
state jurisdiction, but more progress had been made in the federal proceedings, which weighed
on the side of continued federal jurisdiction.
46. Id. at 19. Jurisdiction over a res was not relevant in Moses H. Cone.
47. Id. at 26-27. The Moses H. Cone opinion expressed doubt about the North Carolina
court's willingness to compel arbitration, even under the federal law, and considered the federal
forum less likely to prejudice the plaintiff's rights. Id.
48. Id. at 19. Convenience was not considered to be a factor in Moses H. Cone.
49. Id. at 19-21. Since the arbitration sought by Mercury constituted a separate proceeding,
the choice of a federal rather than a state forum did not itself cause piecemeal adjudication.
50. The Moses H. Cone opinion reiterated the Court's and, particularly, Justice Brennan's
view that only the clearest of justifications warrants federal surrender of jurisdiction in deference
to state proceedings. Id. at 25. The lower courts have shifted from a relatively liberal application
of Colorado River in cases involving parallel state proceedings to a highly restrictive approach.
Compare Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 1982) (ordered
Colorado River stay in deference to state proceedings because suit was filed in state first and
because state court had competence to resolve the suit), and Corinthian Pool Corp. v. National
Northeast Corp., 492 F. Supp. 928, 929 (D.N.H. 1980) (stayed action in deference to identical
state proceedings; no exceptional circumstances cited) with Forehand v. First Ala. Bank, 727
F.2d 1033, 1036 (1lth Cir. 1984) ("clear and exceptional justification" required for dismissing
§ 1983 claim under Colorado River doctrine), and Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 770, 778-79 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("The mandate of Colorado River
and Moses H. Cone requires a federal court to tread carefully when it is asked to abdicate
the responsibility to adjudicate claims that are properly before it.").
Interestingly, the Supreme Court already has decided a case in which the exceptional circumstances called for in Colorado River were found. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 103
S. Ct. 3201, 3212-16 (1983) (federal actions filed by Indian tribes stayed in deference to state
proceedings on water rights).
51. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
52. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which underlies the history of the eleventh amendment, was part of the English common law as early as the thirteenth century. See Borchard,
Government Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 26-27 (1926). Under this doctrine, the King
was not amenable to the jurisdiction of his own courts unless he assented to that jurisdiction.
Id. at 19-20. The doctrine did not relieve the King of his legal liabilities; the King was bound
by traditional duty to consent to such suits. C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 7-8 (1972).
In the United States, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was well-established before the
Constitution was ratified. Id. at 74. It had been invoked successfully by one state in Nathan
v. Virginia (Ct. of Common Pleas, Philadelphia 1781), reprinted in M'Carty v. Nixon, I U.S.
(1 DalI.) 77 (1781). See Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1074-75 (commentary on Nathan).
The Supreme Court declined to interpret the eleventh amendment as a generalized constitu-
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its consent. Yet, the eleventh amendment is an anomoly among the rules that
tional rule of state sovereign immunity in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979). In Hall,
a California court rendered a civil judgment in favor of a California resident against the State
of Nevada. Id. at 413. The California Supreme Court held that Nevada was amenable to suit
in California courts. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court rejected Nevada's argument that the
eleventh amendment, in conjunction with other constitutional clauses, implied interstate sovereign immunity as part of the federal system. Id. at 421.
Notwithstanding the Hall case, the Court has yet to develop a doctrine drawing a
connection between sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment, even though the Court
regularly assumes some vague relationship between them. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at
906 (notes Supreme Court recognition of the eleventh amendment's significance in affirming
the principle that sovereign immunity limits article III judicial authority). Three commentators
have attempted to reconcile these two areas comprehensively-Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,
and Professor Field-although none of their theories have attracted the Court's support.
Justice Brennan articulates a bifurcated view of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in
connection with the eleventh amendment. The amendment, Justice Brennan declares, commands
expressly that states are immune from federal suits by out-of-state persons. See Yeomans v.
Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In contrast, federal suits by
persons against their own states of residence are not barred by the Constitution, although they
may be barred by federal common law sovereign immunity. See Employees of the Dep't. of
Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan refutes the historical assumption that Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), extended the eleventh amendment bar to the latter category of suit. He views
Hans as a case governed by common law sovereign immunity and therefore squarely in the
former category. See Employees 411 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Also, according
to Justice Brennan, when the Constitution was ratified the states surrendered their sovereign
immunity to the extent that Congress can legislate over the states under article I and the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 300-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184, 192 (1964) (Court opinion by Brennan, J.) (by codifying the commerce clause, states
empowered Congress to create causes of action against interstate railroads, including railroads
owned by states). Under Justice Brennan's theory, therefore, Congress may subject states to
suit under any of its plenary powers without running afoul of the eleventh amendment. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's
view on sovereign immunity was expressly adopted by M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 152, and
Gibbons, supra note I, at 1893.
Justice Marshall's approach, in contrast to Justice Brennan's, extends immunity under the
eleventh amendment to states from suits by their own citizens, despite the limited language of
the amendment. Employees, 411 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
contends that article Ill, § 2 of the Constitution, which provides for federal jurisdiction in
"controversies . . . between a State and Citizens from another State," was not intended to
abolish the state's common law sovereign immunity. Id. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall asserts that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the clause in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 430-31 (1793), to allow states to be sued in federal court on the
basis of the article III grant of jurisdiction. 411 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
eleventh amendment thus served to restore state sovereign immunity in federal courts. Id. at
291-92. In Justice Marshall's view, however, sovereign immunity under article III does not
prevent Congress from subjecting states to private suits in state court. 411 U.S. at 298 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
Finally, Professor Field has suggested that the Constitution is neutral toward common law
state sovereign immunity. Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 539. According to Professor Field,
the framers of the Constitution intended to preserve common law sovereign immunity but not
to constitutionalize it. Id. at 541. The eleventh amendment was intended only to correct the
Chisholm Court's reading of article Ill as abrogating common law immunity. Thus, current
common law sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the eleventh amendment, is fungible. It may
be modified or abolished by congressional enactment. Id. at 545.
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govern federal jurisdiction. Unlike the operation of common law immunities"
and personal jurisdiction,54 a state's eleventh amendment privilege against suits
is not necessarily waived by the state's appearance in an action.'I Rather, a state

defendant in federal court may raise the eleventh amendment defense at any
stage of the proceedings, 5" and a federal court must dismiss a case if proceeding
would violate the amendment." The eleventh amendment is not, however, an
absolute limit to federal subject-matter jurisdiction over state defendants. 8 The

53. An immunity is a freedom from suit or liability commonly grounded in the status of
the defendant as a government official or family member. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1032-75 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
State officials enjoy qualified protection under the eleventh amendment for their official
conduct. Such liability is governed by the Young and Edelman doctrines. See infra notes 8190 and accompanying text. The eleventh amendment will not, however, shield an officer from
liability for personal torts. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974); Terry v. Burke,
589 F. Supp. 853, 856 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Beck v. Kansas Univ. Psychiatry Found., 580 F. Supp.
527, 537 (D. Kan. 1984); McAdoo v. Lane, 564 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 n.4 (N.D. 111.1983).
A related area is the federal common law immunity of state officers. This is the nonconstitutional doctrine that accords individual state officers limited or absolute immunity for
torts committed in the course of their official duties. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, at 1059-61.
1059-61.
54. "Personal jurisdiction" (jurisdiction in personam) is the power of a court over a
defendant's person, which is required for the court to enter a personal judgment against the
defendant. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (5th ed. 1979).
55. The right to object to a defect in personal jurisdiction or to assert a personal immunity
is waived by a general appearance in a suit. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
646-7 (2d ed. 1977). The state's general appearance in a suit, however, does not waive the
eleventh amendment. See Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 631 F.2d 1195, 1196 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd
on rehearing, 645 F.2d 2, 3-4 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam); Mills Music Inc. v.
Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1979); Roberts v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 257 (W.D.
La. 1979). But see Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d
470, 475 (3d Cir. 1982) (state participation in consent decree waives eleventh amendment);
Vargus v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir.) (state stipulation that state will honor federal
court order waives eleventh amendment immunity), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008 (1975).
Professor Fletcher disputes the validity of an absolute eleventh amendment jurisdictional bar.
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1091-93. He believes it instead to represent a narrow construction of
the article I11 jurisdictional clause, which bars federal jurisdiction over private suits against
states only when there is no other constitutional basis for jurisdiction in the case (i.e., federal
question). Id.
56. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) ("the Eleventh Amendment
defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised
in the trial court").
57. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945). The
Supreme Court in Ford Motor said that "[tihe Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets
forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power.
... 323 U.S. at 467. The Court then
proceeded to dismiss a suit against the Indiana State treasury. Id. at 483.
58. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907) (eleventh amendment leaves
undisturbed jurisdiction over suits by one state against another). The eleventh amendment bars
parens patriae suits undertaken by one state against another on behalf of individual state citizens.
See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (one state may not sue another
in federal court to enforce bonds sold by the foreign state to its citizens).
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eleventh amendment does not prevent federal courts from hearing federal suits
against states brought by sister states or by the United States. 9 Furthermore,
states may waive the eleventh amendment, expressly by statute6 0 or constructively by conducting interstate commerce under a federal regulatory scheme.6 ,
In addition, Congress can abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity
through legislation enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment and aimed specifically at regulating state conduct.6 ' In other words, the
eleventh amendment resembles neither a federal rule of personal jurisdiction,
nor an absolute limitation on federal subject matter jurisdiction, nor a common
law immunity. It is a doctrine unique unto itself.

59. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (voting rights case).
60. See Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). A state waiver statute
must indicate by express language or "overwhelming implication" that a state is amenable to
suit in federal court. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). The Supreme Court
may be moving to a stiffer standing: that a state's waivor to be sued in federal court must be express. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147 (1985) (state statutory on constitutional waivor of immunity "must specify the state's intention to subject itself to suit in federal
court") (emphasis in original).
61. The doctrine of constructive waiver is stated in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184,
190 (1964) (state railroad subject to federal jurisdiction under Federal Employees Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n., 359
U.S. 275, 281 (1959) (plurality opinion) (interstate compact agency subject to federal jurisdiction
under Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), due to its operation of a bridge over navigable
waters). The Supreme Court has diminished the apparent significance of the constructive waiver
doctrine. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (state hospitals not subject to federal jurisdiction
under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982)). Lower courts are split on the
significance of constructive waiver. Compare Marine Management, Inc. v. Kentucky, 723 F.2d
13, 16 (6th Cir. 1983) (state did not waive federal immunity under Jones Act by building a
bridge over navigable waters), and Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 721 F.2d
934, 941 (4th Cir. 1983) (state did not waive federal immunity under Jones Act by operating
a ferry) with Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 739 F.2d 1034, 1036 (5th
Cir. 1984), and Brody v. North Carolina, 557 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (in both
cases state did waive federal immunity under Jones Act by operating a ferry).
62. In specific cases, Congress may suspend the states' eleventh amendment immunity
through legislation authorized by section five of the fourteenth amendment. Courts have
interpreted various federal statutes to suspend state immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (Court sustained right of state employees to sue state for back pay
under Title VII of Equal Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)); see also Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 n.23 (1978) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982)); NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 951-52 (9th Cir.
1983) (Equal Education Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-58 (1982)). But see Foulks v.
Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 713 F.2d 1229, 1233 (6th Cir. 1983) (42 U.S.C. §
1981 does not lift state immunity). See generally Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1261-62
(Congress may lift state immunity to federal suit under any component of its plenary authority).
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976), the Court found that Congress passed
Title VII under the authority granted by section five of the fourteenth amendment. Other courts
have applied the congressional abrogation doctrine to suits arising under federal laws enacted
pursuant to Congress's other delegated powers. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
New York, 719 F.2d 525, 530 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1590 (1984) (foreign
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The Evolution of the Eleventh Amendment Doctrine

Over the course of the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment decisions,
the Court has veered radically and frequently while supplying the eleventh

amendment with substantive content. In some cases, the Court has been
sensitive to the federalism

63

interest of protecting state sovereignty from

federal intrusion, which is inherent in the eleventh amendment. On these
occasions, the Court has taken a state-protective stance in interpreting the
amendment, shielding the states from federal jurisdiction. 64 In other cases,
the Court has sought to protect individual federal rights from infringement
relations); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1979) (copyright and
patent clause); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 937-38 (7th Cir. 1979) (war
powers); Cribb v. Pelham, 552 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (D.S.C. 1982) (dicta) (thirteenth and
fifteenth amendments). The current test for assessing whether Congress waived state immunity
by legislation is that Congress's "intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment [be expressed]
in unmistakeable language in the statute itself." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S.Ct.
3142, 3148 (1985).
Also, a hybrid of abrogation and constructive waiver may result from a state's acceptance
of federal money under a federal grant program. Congress may impose conditions or affirmative
duties on states that participate in federal grant programs. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981) (explains contours of spending clause). If the
states fail to honor these conditions, to the detriment of private individuals intended to benefit
from the grants, then the federal courts sometimes are willing to imply a cause of action for
those individuals under the grant program that overrides the state's eleventh amendment
immunity. See, e.g., Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 818 (9th Cir. 1983)
(state participation in grants under Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982),
waives eleventh amendment), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2360 (1985). The Supreme Court has said
that in order for federal courts to imply an eleventh amendment waiver, Congress must have
clearly expressed an intention to impose conditions on the grant in the statute itself. See, e.g.,
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3148 (1985). A mere expression by Congress of preferred uses of grant money will not lift the eleventh amendment bar. See, e.g.,
Florida Dep't. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (state agreement to abide by federal law in administering Medicaid program held not a waiver of eleventh
amendment); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974) (state participation in aid to
the aged, blind, or disabled under Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382-1383c (1982), held
not a waiver); cf. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 124-25 (1981) (Congress did not intend to impose
duty on states to provide habilitation to the mentally handicapped in the least restrictive setting
under Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6018
(1982)).
63. "Federalism," in this Note, refers to the doctrine in federal jurisprudence by which
"the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights
and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). In contrast with
comity, see supra note 25, federalism is influenced less by a general deference to state courts
and more by an affirmative interest in maintaining the benefits of a dual federal-state governmental system. See generally Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of
Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 98-99 (1981) ("the main elements of the opinion
are protective of the purposes that the framers intended the states to serve in the federal
system").
64. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 657-59 (1974) (eleventh amendment bars
retroactive monetary recovery against state officers in federal court); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 15-21 (1890) (eleventh amendment bars federal suit by private individual citizen against
his own state of residence).
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by states and to provide a federal forum to guarantee those rights. On these
occasions, the Court has adopted a plaintiff-protective stance, opening avenues through which the states could be sued by private individuals in federal
court. 65 The net result of the Court's decisions interpreting the eleventh
amendment is a doctrine which successfully, though inelegantly, reconciles
the constitutional immunity of the states with the federal interest in hearing
federal claims against the states. 66 This compromise has been accomplished
67
by the strategic use of fiction under the heading of the Young doctrine.
States were immune from suit under the common law before the advent
of the federal union. 6 During the ratification of the Constitution, some antifederalist critics maintained that the states would lose their sovereign immunity in the new national court. They raised the spector of states being
dragged into financially ruinous lawsuits by Revolutionary War creditors
and other antagonists. 69 Some state ratifying conventions even recommended
changes in article III to protect states from suit. 70 According to tradition, in

the give-and-take of the ratification process an "original understanding"
was reached between the proponents of the Constitution and the ratifying
state delegates that federal courts would not entertain suits against nonconsenting states. 7'
65. See, e.g., Ex parte Young 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908) (eleventh amendment does not bar
private individual from seeking a federal injunction against state officials); Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 856-59 (1824) (eleventh amendment bars only cases
in which state is a party of record; state officials are not immune under eleventh amendment).
amendment).
66. See Baker, supra note 1, at 139-40 ("[T]he courts are trying to construct an eleventh
amendment doctrine that will allow them to balance federal and state interests in an appropriate
fashion.").
67. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also infra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text (discussion of Young).
68. See C. JACOBS, supra note 52, at 12-13; 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 91, 96 (rev. ed. 1957).
69. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 542-43 (J. Elliot ed. 1866 & photo, reprint 1941) [hereinafter cited as
DEBATES] (Patrick Henry predicted that article III would leave Virginia open to suit by its
creditors, thus inviting financial ruin); id. at 527 (George Mason argued that Virginia's confiscation of British lands could be deemed illegal by a federal court). But see C. JACOBS, supra
note 52, at 69-70 (declaring that the national government had already satisfied most of the
states' pre-war obligations).
70. See 2 DEBATES, supra note 69, at 409 (New York proposed an amendment to article
III, § 2 to constitutionalize state sovereign immunity); 3 DEBATES, supra note 69, at 660 (Virginia
convention proposed amendment to article Ill, § 2 to restrict original jurisdiction of federal
courts over states to cases arising under treaties); 4 DEBATES, supra note 69, at 246 (North
Carolina convention proposed an amendment to article Ill, § 2 that was identical to Virginia's
proposal).
71. Belief in the "original understanding" between the states and the national government
concerning the jurisdictional clause is an article of faith in eleventh amendment jurisprudence.
See Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 906; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-62 n.9 (1974); Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890).
The wellspring of this traditional understanding is a litany of three quotes from famous
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If ever such an "understanding" existed, it was quickly upset by the 1793
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.2 In Chisholm, the Supreme Court accepted
original jurisdiction in a suit originally brought by two citizens of South
Carolina against the State of Georgia. In so doing, the Court interpreted
article III to permit suits by private individuals against states in federal
court. 7 This decision is said to have created such a "shock of surprise""4
among the states that the eleventh amendment was adopted and quickly
ratified, the immediate effect of which was to overturn Chisholm's result.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the eleventh amendment began
as a highly plaintiff-protective law and developed into a strongly stateprotective law. In an early decision, Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
Chief Justice Marshall construed the eleventh amendment as barring a lawsuit
only where the state was formally a party of record." A private individual
deciding to sue a state after Osborn could do so through the expedient of
suing a state official. This plaintiff-protective interpretation remained in
effect until shortly after the Civil War. 76 During Reconstruction, the Supreme
contemporaries of the ratification process. See 2 DEBATES, supra note 69, at 533 (James Madison:
"It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into [federal] court."); 3 DEBATES, supra
note 69, at 555 (John Marshall: "I hope that no gentlemen will think that a state will be called
at the bar of the federal court."); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 511-12 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright
ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent"). All of the above statesmen are quoted
together in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-25 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 13-15 (1890); Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191, 1193 n.1 (4th Cir. 1973); see also I C.
WARREN, supra note 68, at 91 (furnishes a scholarly imprimatur for original understanding
theory).
The actual existence of such an original understanding has been vigorously challenged in
recent works about the eleventh amendment. See C. JACOBS, supra note 52, at 27-43, 67-70;
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1045-63; Gibbons, supra note I, at 1895-1914. See also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3157-77 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comprehensive review of eleventh amendment history and scholarship). These commentators each evaluate
the historical evidence and conclude that the Framers intended article III to abolish state sovereign
immunity. For theories linking the eleventh amendment with sovereign immunity, see supra
note 52.
72. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
73. The second section in article 111,which gives federal courts jurisdiction over "Cases
and Controversies . . . between a state and a citizen of another state," was interpreted by a
majority of the four justices in Chisholm as conferring jurisdiction upon federal courts over
private suits against states. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (clause
unambiguously creates jurisdiction). The traditional history of the eleventh amendment indicates
that the Chisholm result was not in accord with the framers' constitutional plan. Some support
for this view appears in the state constitutional ratification debates. See 2 DEBATES, supra note
69, at 491 (James Wilson advocating that abrogation of states' sovereign immunity under article
Ill allows citizens to "stand on a just and equal footing" with state in federal court); 3 DEBATES,
supra note 69, at 207 (Edmund Randolph extolling the virtues of abolishing sovereign immunity under article 11). But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 19 (1890) (some framers apparently concurred with Chisholm Court's interpretation of Supreme Court's original jurisdiction).
74. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5 (1890).
75. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 842 (1824).
76. In one post-Civil War case, the Court favorably restated and applied the Osborn rule:
"Making a state officer a party does not make the state a party, although her law may have
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Court shifted sharply to a state-protective stance. In a succession of cases
beginning with Louisiana ex. ret. Elliot v. Jumel," the Court held that an
out-of-state creditor could not sue a state official to recover on defaulted
state loans. Disregarding the Marshall-era precedent,"9 the Court declared
that a suit against a state treasurer for payment of state debts is effectively
a suit against the state and thus precluded by the eleventh amendment.
In the crucible of the Reconstruction creditor cases, the Supreme Court
formed its most provocative state-protective rule. In the 1890 decision of

Hans v. Louisiana,79 the Court held that private plaintiffs could not sue

their own states of residence in federal court, even when such suits were
predicated on federal question jurisdiction. The decision extended well beyond
the language of the eleventh amendment, which by its own terms applied
only to citizens and aliens who resided out of state. The Hans Court determined that the eleventh amendment was a constitutional mandate of state
sovereign immunity, and that the framers of the amendment, therefore, could
not possibly have intended for private individuals to have license to sue states
in federal court purely by accident of their in-state residence. 8"

prompted his action and the state may stand behind him as a real party in interest." Davis v.
Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872); see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207-08
(1882); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875) (both restating the Osborn
rule with approval).
77. 107 U.S. 711 (1882); see also Louisiana ex rel. New York Guar. & Indem. Co. v. Steele,
134 U.S. 230, 232 (1890) (suit to compel state auditor to raise taxes was barred); Hagood v.
Southern Ry., 117 U.S. 52, 70 (1886) (suit against official seeking to compel official to perform state's obligation was a suit against the state); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R.,
109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883) (suit barred because state was indispensible party to foreclosure);
Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 783 (1882) (mandamus action barred). But see Virginia
Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885) (repudiation of specially drafted debt instruments by Virginia
violates the contract clause). Two commentators, placing the Reconstruction-era cases in their
historical context, concluded that the Supreme Court shifted ground on the eleventh amendment to avoid confrontation with the repudiating states. See Gibbons, supra note 1,at 1973-2003;
Orth, supra note 1, 431-50.
78. In fact, the Jumel Court did draw a feeble distinction between Osborn and Jumel. In
Osborn, the state treasurer, sued by the Bank of the United States, allegedly confiscated the
Bank's notes under the color of an arguably unconstitutional state tax. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
740-41. The treasurer still held the notes at the time of the suit, not yet having deposited them
into the state treasury. Id. at 742. In Jumel, by contrast, the state originally had incurred the
disputed debt in its own name. 107 U.S. at 714. The Jumel court asserted that in Jumel the
suit was against the state treasury, while in Osborne the suit was against the treasurer. Id. at
724-25.
79. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
80. Id. at 15. Professor Thornton contends that Hans has been modified by Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), in so far as the Court recognized Congress's power to lift the
states' eleventh amendment immunity under its delegated powers. Thornton, supra note 1, at
346-47.
Since Hans, the Supreme Court has viewed the eleventh amendment as a complete bar to all
private suits against states in federal court. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 907 ("the
principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power
established in article III."). Some commentators, however, view the Court's eleventh amendment
immunity doctrine as a departure from the historical purpose of the amendment. See Field,
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Within two decades of the Hans decision, the Court once again changed
direction, shifting back to a plaintiff-protective stance. In 1908, the Court
decided the landmark case of Exparte Young." A federal district court held
the attorney general of Minnesota in contempt for violating an injunction
that prohibited him from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional rail reguPart One, supra note 1, at 543; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1087-90; Gibbons, supra note 1, at
1893-94. In their view, the amendment was crafted merely to correct the Chisholm Court's
interpretation of article Ill as completely abolishing state sovereign immunity in federal courts.
See Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1063. The Framers intended to preserve federal question jurisdiction as a basis for private suits against states. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1045-63
(framers of amendment did not intend to abolish federal causes of action against states);
Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1926-39 (amendment was passed as a political compromise between
Federalists and Republicans in Congress; amendment intended merely to eliminate federal jurisdiction over suits against states in which jurisdiction was based purely on parties status under
article 1I).
Except for Baker, supra note 1, all of the commentators view with unalloyed hostility the
extent to which the eleventh amendment shields states from accountability in federal court for
violations of federal law. While the Court has notched out practical exceptions to the amendment
to mitigate the harsh affects of sovereign immunity on private persons, several commentators
have urged the Supreme Court to reconsider eleventh amendment doctrine and to make states
directly suable in federal court for violation of federal law.
Professors Field and Fletcher each suggest that the only tenable view of the eleventh
amendment is as a limited exception to the clause in article III which creates federal jurisdiction
over cases between a state and a citizen of another state. See Field, Part One, supra note 1, at
538-40; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1063. Both commentators call for complete elimination of
constitutional sovereign immunity and recommend other sources for limitations on federal
power over state governments. Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 549 (common law sovereign
immunity should replace eleventh amendment); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1109-13 (tenth
amendment protects states from extinction); see also Gibbons, supra note 1, at 2004 (suggesting
that if Hans were overruled, debate over federal doctrine of sovereign immunity "could move
to the practical policy level").
Some authors have suggested that the Court should overrule the Hans holding that states
cannot be sued by their own citizens. M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 151-53; Thornton, supra
note 1, at 336-37. Such a ruling would have changed the outcome in suits such as Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), in which inmates of an Alabama prison sued the state
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court dismissed the suit against Alabama, finding
that the eleventh amendment barred the suit in spite of the fact that the prisoners were residents
of Alabama and therefore were not precluded from suing the state by the literal terms of the
amendment. 438 U.S. at 782. If the Court overruled Hans, federal courts would be able to
exercise jurisdiction over such cases as Pugh, while retaining the bar to suits against states by
non-citizens. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 152 (constitutional amendment necessary to lift
eleventh amendment bar to suits by out-of-state persons); Thornton, supra note 1, at 336-37.
One commentator has suggested that the Court take an explicit balancing approach to eleventh
amendment controversies, basing the jurisdiction of federal courts over state defendants upon
the exigencies of the federal system. See Baker, supra note 1, at 88. Under this analysis, states
would lose their immunity in suits based upon congressional statutes that place reasonably
specific obligations on states, or upon the Constitution. Id. Two other commentators have
recommended a special federal question exception to the eleventh amendment. L. TRIBE, supra
note 1, at 139-43. The exception would be limited to causes of action created expressly by
Congress. This exception recognizes the importance of federal courts in enforcing federal rights,
but precludes judicial decision-making about the appropriate balance of state and federal powers.
See Nowak, supra note 1, at 1468-69.
81. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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latory scheme. 8 2 Young, the attorney general, challenged the contempt finding
by filing a petition for a writ of habeous corpus. The Supreme Court declined
to issue the writ, affirming the district court's jurisdiction to issue the
injunction. 83 Following the reasoning announced by the Young Court, a state
official may be sued by private individuals in federal court to enjoin state
conduct that violates federal law.
The Young decision created a legal fiction-the Supreme Court characterized the injunction against Young as an order issued to Young personally
to conform his conduct to his legal duties under federal law. The force of
the injunction extended only to the officer, not to the state. The Court said
that a state could not authorize conduct by its officers that violated the
Constitution.8 4 Since Minnesota could not have authorized Young to enforce
unconstitutional railroad regulations, the Court concluded that Young enforced the regulations in his personal capacity and, therefore, could not
share in Minnesota's eleventh amendment immunity.85
The fiction of Young is easily understood in light of the fact that states
can only function through their officials, and that therefore an injunction
against a state official in his official capacity is a de facto injunction against
a state. The effect of Young is to allow, through the back door, suits against
states which would otherwise be barred by the eleventh amendment. In spite
of the fictional content of the Young doctrine, all commentators agree that
6
Young is an important and necessary exception to the eleventh amendment.1

82. Id. at 134. The injunction restrained Edward T. Young, the attorney general of Minnesota, from taking any steps to enforce either the railroad rate regulation laws enacted by the
state legislature or various rate and tariff orders prescribed by the Railroad and Warehouse
Commission. Young refused to observe the injunction, believing it to be invalid under the
eleventh amendment. Id. at 132, 134.
83. Id. at 145.
84. The central fiction of Young is that "the state has no power to impart to [its officers]
any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States," and therefore
a state is incapable of participating in the unconstitutional conduct of its officers for the
purposes of the eleventh amendment. Id. at 160.
85. Id. at 159.
[T]he use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act . . . is a
proceeding without the authority of and . . . which does not affect the State in
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce
a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional.
A similar argument appears in some pre-Young sovereign immunity suits. See, e.g., Gunter
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 283-84 (1906) (attorney general made defendant in
suit to enjoin unconstitutional tax); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 533-34 (1903); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898) (in both Prout and Smyth, the attorney general made
defendant in suit to enjoin unconstitutional railroad regulations).
86. Professor Wright has stated that "in perspective the doctrine of Ex parte Young seems
indispensible to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." C. WRIGHT,
supra note 11,at 292; accord NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (2d ed.
1983); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 146. This is true because the Young doctrine permits federal
courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of state laws. As Oliver Wendall Holmes once said,
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if [the Court] lost [its] power to
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The Young doctrine has endured to the present day, but it was qualified
7
by the Supreme Court's 1974 decision, Edelman v. Jordan. In Edelman, a
federal district court ordered Illinois welfare officials to "release and remit"
federally subsidized payments formally withheld from qualified applicants
under the federal-state cooperative programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and
Disabled." The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order; in so
doing, the Court refused to extend Young to cover retroactive monetary
awards against state officials. The Court concluded that to allow a monetary
award against state officials in this case would in reality place state treasuries
within the reach of private individual plaintiffs.8 9 This result, the Court
implied, passed beyond the hazy frontiers of the Young fiction and constituted a suit against the state itself. 90 Such a suit, the Court reasoned, is
barred by the eleventh amendment.
Edelman did not go so far, however, as to bar all fiscal claims by individual
citizens against states and state officials. The Edelman Court conceded that
state expenditures might be "the necessary result of compliance with decrees
which . . . [are] prospective in nature." 9' In subsequent cases, the Court has
distinguished Edelman when a federal court has ordered a state to expend
funds to satisfy the requirements of a prospective injunction. For example,
when the Edelman case returned to the Supreme Court in 1979, the Court
unanimously affirmed a federal district court order that Illinois state officials
notify plaintiff class members, at state expense, that they had been wrongly
92
denied public assistance.
1I.

THE

Pennhurst

CASE

Before Pennhurst, the Supreme Court had never directly confronted the
issue of whether the Young doctrine authorized private suits in federal court
declare an act of Congress void. I do think that the Union would be imperiled if we could not
make that declaration as to the laws of the several states." O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
87. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Edelman was reaffirmed in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 33839 n.8 (1979).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382-1383c (1982).
89. The Edelman Court considered the source of plaintiff's award in this case to be "in
practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages against the State.
... 415 U.S. at 668.
It [would] to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds.
90. "The funds to satisfy the award in this case must inevitably come from the general
revenues of the State of Illinois, and thus the award resembles far more closely the monetary
award against the state itself . . . than it does the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Ex

parte Young." Id. at 665.
91. Id. at 668.
92. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699700 (1978) (Court affirmed award of attorney's fees, to be paid by state, because of the state's
bad faith in failing to comply with a federal court order); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
289 (1977) (Court affirmed desegregation order, with express recognition of the consequent
expense to the state in implementing it). But see Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277, 285-89 (6th
Cir. 1984) (eleventh amendment bars notice order, when notice is not ancillary to another
prospective court order).
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against state officials based on state law claims. The peculiar procedural
history of Pennhurst,however, placed the question squarely before the Court.
Pennhurst was an appeal from a federal court of appeals order granting

class action injunctive relief against state officials. 93 The injunction satisfied
the requirements of Young by naming a state officer, and Edelman by
seeking only prospective relief. It was, however, based solely on state law.

The action commenced in 1974 when Terri Lee Halderman, a developmentally
disabled minor resident of Pennhurst State School & Hospital (Pennhurst),
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania for herself and all other Pennhurst residents against Pennhurst, its superintendent, various Pennsylvania state officials, and officials
from the five counties whose populations were served by Pennhurst. The
complaint alleged that Pennhurst residents were subjected to dangerous living
conditions and inadequate health care and education programs. 94 The district

court made findings of fact and conclusions of law that the defendants
violated various constitutional and statutory rights of the plaintiff class. The
rights violated included the right to "minimally adequate habilitation" 95
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 96 and the Penn97
sylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act),
and the right to the "least restrictive setting"9 for treatment of the mentally
93. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 900 (1984).
94. Conditions at Pennhurst were hazardous to the patients; patients were often physically
abused, bound in restraints, or drugged by staff members. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
& Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1306-11 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Also, health care and educational programs at Pennhurst were found
inadequate or non-existent. 446 F. Supp, at 1308-10. The facility was unsanitary and understaffed.
Id. at 1306-08.
95. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. Habilitation is:
the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to acquire and
maintain those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands
of his own person and of his environment, and to raise the level of his physical,
mental, and social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of
formal, structured education and treatment.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
96. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1983).
98. "Least restrictive environment" means,
that to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children are educated with
children who are not handicapped, and that removal of handicapped children from
the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
41 Fed. Reg. 56,972 (1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 121a). See generally Miller & Miller, The
Education for All Handicapped Act: How Well Does It Accomplish Its Goal of Promoting
the Least Restrictive Environment for Education? 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 321 (1979) (discussing
problems with the Act that frustrate goal of mainstreaming a handicapped child); Miller &
Miller, The Handicapped Child's Right as It Relates to the "Least Restrictive Environment"
and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1979) (discussing reasons school officials fail
to properly implement mainstreaming programs).
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handicapped under the due process clause. The district court ordered the
defendants to close Pennhurst and to transfer its residents to communitybased treatment alternatives. The court appointed a special master to ad99
minister the order.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment." °0 The court modified the remedy by reversing the
order to close the school, but affirmed the order to transfer most of
Pennhurst's residents to the community.' 0' The two pertinent issues before
the Third Circuit were whether the various statutory and constitutional
provisions considered by the district court contained a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive setting for the mentally handicapped, and whether the
eleventh amendment barred the class action because of the financial impact
of the judgment on the state. With respect to the former issue, the court
affirmed the district court's determination that the mentally handicapped
have a right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting. 02 Seeking to avoid
the constitutional issues, however, the court of appeals held that this right
was based on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act of 1975 (the Bill of Rights Act), 03 a federal-state grant program under
which the federal government financed improvements in state education of
the mentally handicapped. The court of appeals determined that affirmative
statutory duties, as outlined in the Bill of Rights section of the Act, were
imposed upon Pennhurst as a condition of receiving funds under the Bill of
Rights Act. The court also concluded that mentally retarded persons had an
implied cause of action to enforce that right. 04 Finally, the court of appeals
dispensed with the eleventh amendment defense by stating that the amendment did not preclude a federal injunction against state officials, per the
Young doctrine, even if that injunction had ancillary fiscal consequences for
the state. 05
The Supreme Court, on its first review of Pennhurst, reversed the court
of appeals. 0 6 The Court determined that the Bill of Rights Act placed no
duty on state grant recipients to provide habilitation for the mentally hand-

99. 446 F. Supp. at 1326-29. The district court announced the rule that, as a constitutional
principle, the mentally handicapped are entitled to treatment in the least restrictive setting. Id.
at 1319. This decision was regarded as a groundbreaking case in the law of treatment for the
mentally handicapped. See Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the
Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REv. 717 (1979); see also Note, Rights of the Mentally Retarded:
Halderman v. Pennhurst Closes State Institution and Mandates Community Care, 57 N.C.L.
REv. 336, 350 (1979) (describing Pennhurst as "blueprint" for deinstitutionalization litigation).
100. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981).
102. Id. at 95-100.
103. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§
6001-6081 (1982).
104. 612 F.2d at 97-100.
105. Id. at 109.
106. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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icapped in the least restrictive setting. 0 7 The Court remanded the case to the
court of appeals with instructions to reconsider the plaintiff class's claims
based on Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act and other federal law. 108 The opinion
did not mention the eleventh amendment defense raised in the court of
appeals.
On remand, the court of appeals affirmed its prior judgment, this time
basing its decision solely on Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act. 10 9 The court of
appeals exercised jurisdiction over the state law claim by virtue of its
pendency with the federal statutory and constitutional claims originally
adjudicated by the district court."10 The Third Circuit noted that a recent
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, In re Joseph Schmidt,", had definitely
interpreted the MH/MR Act to require habilitation of the mentally handicapped in the least restrictive setting. Applying the Pennsylvania decision to
the Pennhurst facts, the court determined that the MH/MR Act fully supported its prior judgment.
The court of appeals also rejected the eleventh amendment defense raised
by the Pennhurst defendants." 2 The defendants argued that the amendment
applied in a "particular and different" way to state law claims than to
federal law claims." 3 While the Young doctrine lifts the eleventh amendment
to allow federal courts to adjudicate federal claims, the defendants claimed
that there was no similar federal interest in federal courts hearing state claims
against state officials. In response, the court of appeals observed that federal
courts were supposed to avoid making constitutional decisions and that in
a case such as this, where the state law was unambiguous, the principles of
14
judicial restraint called for the court to adjudicate the state claims first."
The court noted that in a 1909 Supreme Court decision, Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co.,', a lawsuit against state officials was based solely
upon pendent state claims. Finally, the court regarded the Supreme Court's
' 16
remand as "an express mandate . . [to] reconsider the state law issue. "
107. "[W~e find nothing in the Act or its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended
to require the States to assume the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least
restrictive environment' to their mentally retarded citizens." Id. at 18.
108. Id. at 31 & n.24.
109. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 651-56 (3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
l10. Id. at 650-51.
111. 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
112. 673 F.2d at 656-59.
113. Id. at 657.
114. Id. at 658-59.
115. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). In Siler, the railroad challenged a state order regulating its rates
as unauthorized by state law and as violative of due process. Id. at 190-91. The Supreme Court
determined that the federal district court had pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Id. at 191-92. The Court then declared that the lower court should proceed on the state claims
first to moot, if possible, the federal constitutional question. Id. at 193. Professor Shapiro
indicates that this latter aspect of the Siler decision has been overruled by Pennhurst. Shapiro,
supra note 1,at 65 n.29.
116. 673 F.2d at 659.
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In light of all of these factors, the court of appeals retained jurisdiction over

the state law claims and entered a judgment for the plaintiff class.
Pennhurst again went to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court again
reversed the Third Circuit. 17 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, seized
upon Pennhurst as an opportunity to clarify the Young doctrine. The Court
framed the issue in Pennhurst as whether the Young doctrine lifted the
eleventh amendment bar to private federal suits against state officials when

the claim for injunctive relief" 8 was based on state law. The Court concluded
that Young did not extend to such suits and as a consequence such suits
were barred by the eleventh amendment.''
The Young doctrine is, from the Court's perspective, a necessary exception
to the eleventh amendment that allows the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and to enforce federal law against state officials.' 2 ° The eleventh
amendment embodies a rule of state sovereign immunity; as a general
proposition, it bars all suits by private individuals against states in federal
courts.'' When the federal judiciary has an interest in enforcing federal
rights over state prerogative, however, the federal system cannot tolerate the
eleventh amendment bar. The Young doctrine, therefore, allowed individ-

117. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). Justice Powell wrote the Court's opinion, which was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
118. Id. at 906. The claim in Pennhurst was for injunctive relief since the Court in Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), barred the use of the Young doctrine by private parties to
extract money damages from state defendants. The Court has not yet considered the effect of
Young on a private party seeking declaratory relief against a state. See Shapiro, supra note 1,
at 82 (suggesting that Young doctrine could accommodate declaratory relief). It thus appears
that the type of relief sought affects the applicability of the eleventh amendment immunity.
119. 104 S. Ct. at 909-11. The Court passed over two lesser issues which might have resolved
the Pennhurst case without resort to the eleventh amendment: whether the doctrine of comity
prohibited the district court from issuing injunctive relief, and whether the district court abused
its equitable discretion in appointing special masters to supervise the administration of state
law. Id. at 906.
The Court also rejected two alternative bases for jurisdiction in Pennhurst which would have
avoided the eleventh amendment. First, the United States intervention as a plaintiff caused the
suit to become one between the United States and Pennsylvania, permissible under article III.
Id. at 909-10 n.12. The Court determined, however, that the United States had no standing to
assert the state-law claims on behalf of the third-party plaintiffs, and that therefore the United
States' presence had no affect on the state law claims. Second, Pennsylvania abolished its
sovereign immunity and thereby waived the eleventh amendment bar. Id. The court concluded
briefly that at the time Pennhurst was first filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted
only when the state legislature expressly authorized them, and that the legislature had never
waived the state's eleventh amendment immunity. Id.; see Shapiro, supra note 1, at 76-79 (eleventh
amendment and sovereign immunity were inappropriately used in Pennhurst).
120. 104 S. Ct. at 910. Justice Stevens's dissent criticized the Court's federal supremacy view
of the Young doctrine as "unprincipled." Id. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Shapiro,
supra note 1, at 67 n.35, 83-34 (Court's federal supremacy approach to Young may in some
instances limit eleventh amendment and is, therefore, beneficial).
121. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 907 (reciting principle of sovereign immunity).
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uals to enforce their federal rights against state officials whose conduct

22
violates federal law.1

The Court concluded, however, that when private suits against state
officials do not present federal issues, the Young doctrine does not apply.
Since a federal court's grant of relief based on state law would not vindicate
federal rights, the Court stated that the "entire basis for the doctrine of
Young . . . disappears."' '2 3 The Court further concluded that "a claim that
state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities
'2 4
is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment.'
Thus, the Court determined that the eleventh amendment barred pendent
state claims by private parties against state officials in federal court. Yet,
the Court acknowledged that Siler, the case cited by the court of appeals,
and cases following Siler implied a different rule: that the eleventh amendment did not bar pendent state claims once the federal basis for jurisdiction
was established. 2 Noting, however, that those cases did not expressly consider the eleventh amendment in connection with pendent state law claims,
the Court decided that it was not bound by those cases.' 26 After declaring
that the eleventh amendment barred a federal court from hearing state claims
against state officers generally, the
Court held specifically that the bar applied
27
particularly to pendent claims.'

The principal dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by three
Justices, staked out a view of the Young doctrine that was radically different
from the Court's. While Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that the
eleventh amendment represents a federal constitutional rule of sovereign
immunity,'2 8 he vigorously disputed the Court's characterization of Young
as a doctrine of federal supremacy.2 9 Instead, Justice Stevens viewed the
Young doctrine as an explication of the common law rule of ultra vires.
Ultra vires conduct, in the context of sovereign immunity, is activity by a
state officer that, although ostensibly undertaken in the course of official
business, is not authorized by the law of the sovereign. Authorized official
activity is protected from judicial review under sovereign immunity

122. Id.at 910.
123. Id. at 911.
124. Id. at 919.
125. Id.at 917-18.
126. Id. at 918 (referring to prior decisions as passing on jurisdictional issues sub silentio).
127. Id. at 922.
128. Id. at 932-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Hans v. Louisiana, as rule of sovereign
immunity); Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens's dissent.
129. Id. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited a long list of cases in which
suit was held to be barred by the eleventh amendment, despite the presence of a federal statute
as a possible rule of decision. Id. at 933 n.28.
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doctrine;' 3 unauthorized activity is not.'3 The dissent traced the history of
sovereign immunity and found that, since the fifteenth century in England,
the common law distinguished between the King and his officers. While the
King was immune from prosecution, the King's officers were not considered
immune when they violated the King's law.' According to Justice Stevens,
the distinction between officers and the sovereign, which lies at the heart of
the doctrine of ultra vires, is imbedded in the eleventh amendment.'" Young,
according to Justice Stevens, merely restated this old law in a constitutional
setting. Because a state cannot authorize unlawful conduct, state officers
who have allegedly violated state or federal law are stripped of their sovereign
identity and may not enjoy the state's sovereign immunity under the eleventh
amendment. 3' Under this view of the Young doctrine, the dissent considered
130. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). While Larson
deals with the sovereign immunity of the United States, the Supreme Court has treated state
and federal sovereign immunity as interchangeable doctrines. In Larson, the Court ordered
dismissal of an action by the Commerce Corporation against a War Assets Administrator
seeking to enjoin the sale of coal under one contract which the plaintiff allegedly purchased
under another contract. 337 U.S. at 705. The Court stated that the action was against the
United States, since the Administrator was performing as an agent for the United States in
each contract. In dicta, the Court said that if the official did something which the government
had neither authorized nor affirmatively proscribed, then the actions are ultra vires and thus
not shielded by sovereign immunity. Id. at 689.
131. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (plurality
opinion). The decision in Treasure Salvors, in relevant part, turned upon the presence or absence
of legal authority in Florida state officials to retain treasure discovered by private persons in
extraterritorial waters. 458 U.S. at 692-97. Treasure Salvors filed an admiralty in rem action
in federal district court to claim title of ownership to a sunken galleon and the treasure that
was discovered within it. The state officials retained some of the treasure pursuant to certain
contracts drawn between the state and Treasure Salvors. To bring the case within its jurisdiction,
the district court ordered the United States Marshall to arrest the artifacts. Id. at 678. The
state officials challenged the order, citing the eleventh amendment. A four-Justice plurality of
the Supreme Court determined that the eleventh amendment did not bar process to secure
possession of the artifacts because the state officials named in the warrant had no legal authority
to refuse to surrender the artifacts. Id. at 700.
132. 104 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 935 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The cases cited by Justice Stevens in support of his ultimate
position, that a state official's violation of state law divests the official of eleventh amendment
immunity, are uncertain authority. In Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918), the judgment
against the state official was based more on the official's personal torts than on his violations
of state law. Id. at 546. The same may be said of Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908), in which
a state officer tortiously interfered with a corporation's business activities. Justice Stevens's
view is apparently supported by Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1887). In
Rolston, the Court affirmed a federal decree restraining state officers from violating a state
statute involving the state bond sinking fund. 120 U.S. at 412. Rolston's precedential authority,
however, is dimmed by the fact that it preceeded Young by 20 years, and also by the fact that
the Court addressed the eleventh amendment only in a brief paragraph at the end of the
opinion. 120 U.S. at 411.
The Court treated Justice Stevens's discourse on the ultra vires doctrine with brutal contempt.
See, e.g., Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 911 ("Justice Stevens' dissent rests on fiction, is wrong on
the law, and . . . is out of touch with reality."). The Court described the ultra vires doctrine
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the court of appeals' order to be proper. The defendants operated Pennhurst
in a manner not authorized by the state under the MH/MR Act; hence they

did not enjoy the sovereign immunity of the state. The eleventh amendment,
therefore, should not have barred the federal injunction against the Pennhurst defendants.'35
Justice Brennan submitted a brief dissent reflecting his idiosyncratic views
on the eleventh amendment. 3 6 Since 19731'" Justice Brennan has advocated

a literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment, which forbids only those
federal suits between an out-of-state plaintiff and a state defendant. 3 ' A

federal suit between a plaintiff and a plaintiff's home state, by contrast, is
constitutionally acceptable according to the literal terms of the amendment. 3 9

Therefore, since Pennhurst was a case from the latter category, the constias a narrow exception to the eleventh amendment, applicable to an official only when the
official's conduct is "without any authority whatsoever," and where the ultra vires claim rests
on the "official's lack of delegated power." Id. at 908-09 n.ll (citing Florida Dep't of State
v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949)). The Court also contemplated the impending demise of the ultra vires
doctrine in the eleventh amendment context. Id. at 915-16 n.25.
135. 104 S. Ct. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 921-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Justice Brennan's manifesto on the eleventh amendment appears in Employees of the
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs in Employees filed an action in federal court
to recover past overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Id. at
281. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. Id. at 287. Six Justices,
interpreting the FLSA, determined that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of
action against state employers. Id. at 285. Justices Stewart and Marshall concurred in the result
and declared that the federal judicial power never extends to suits by private parties against
unconsenting states. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, the lone dissenter, argued that the eleventh amendment did not apply to
the case since the plaintiffs were suing their own state. Id. at 298-324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The literal terms of the amendment bar only suits against states by out-of-state persons. Justice
Brennan argued that history provided no evidence that the drafters of the eleventh amendment
intended to constitutionalize state sovereign immunity. Id. at 310-11, 318-21 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He also argued that, in so far as federal courts observe some common law state
sovereign immunity, the power of Congress to regulate commerce, as under FLSA, supercedes
that immunity. Id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 52, 71 (further discussion
of Justice Brennan's views).
138. Justice Brennan voted to dismiss a recent case on eleventh amendment grounds. See
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (Brennan, J., concurring) (dismissal of private federal interpleader action against state officials of California and Texas).
139. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 700 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983,
984 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). While Justice Brennan's view of the eleventh amendment has received no support
on the Court, it has earned praise from legal scholars. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 1, at
152 (arguing that express language of amendment should be used to introduce flexibility
into eleventh amendment doctrine); Gibbons, supra note I, at 1893-94 ("Justice Brennan's
interpretation of the amendment is the only one consistent with its plain language, with the
history of its adoption, and with the earliest interpretations of its terms"); Thornton, supra
note 1, at 336-37 (endorsing Brennan's dissent in Employees).
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tutional inquiry on the federal court's jurisdiction in Pennhurst should have
140
been resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
Ill.

ANALYSIS OF THE PENNHURST DECISION

Pennhurst, like Edelman, qualified the Young doctrine. Through Pennhurst, the Supreme Court has barred federal jurisdiction over state law claims
seeking injunctive relief in private suits against state officers. The Young
opinion and subsequent eleventh amendment decisions were silent on the relationship of the eleventh amendment to state law claims.'" Operating on a
clean slate, therefore, the Court refused to extend the Young doctrine to
allow state officers to be sued on state claims in federal court. The Pennhurst Court said that a contrary result would place an unnecessary strain
on the federal system by allowing federal courts to interfere with state efforts to implement local policy. "Such a result," the Court reasoned, "conflicts directly with the principles of federalism which underlie the eleventh
amendment."' 2
The Pennhurst Court's decision to relegate state claims to state courts did
not have to rest on a constitutional basis. The Court could have narrowed
the scope of federal pendent jurisdiction to preclude state law claims against
state officers. The Court could also have directed the federal courts to
abstain completely from cases such as Pennhurst in which a remedy will
foreseeably require extensive federal supervision of state agencies based on
state law. Both of these alternatives share the virtue of leaving the decision
of whether to hear the state claims to the discretion of the federal district
court.
With respect to the first of these two alternatives, the Pennhurst Court
could have ordered the court of appeals to dismiss the pendent state claims
against the Pennhurst officials by deciding that the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction in this case violated notions of federalism and comity. When the
43
Supreme Court set out the modern law of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs,
it also established that federal courts have broad discretion to refuse to hear
pendent claims. According to the Gibbs Court, a district court is supposed
to weigh "considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants" in determining whether to extend jurisdiction to pendent state
claims.'" The Gibbs Court also said that the district court's decision must

140. Justice Brennan joined Justice Stevens's dissent "[tlothe extent that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply .... Id. at 922 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
141. Justice Stevens disputed this representation of the precedent. Id. at 924-29 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). But see supra note 134 (precedent related to state-law ultra vires doctrine sketchy
at best).
142. 104 S. Ct. at 911.

143. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
144. 383 U.S. at 726; see, e.g., Kohlasch v. New York State Thruway Auth., 482 F. Supp.
721 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (federal court declined pendent jurisdiction over state claims where a plaintiff
had already brought state law claims against defendants in two separate state forums). Dawes
v. Philadelphia Gas Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (federal court declined jurisdiction
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take into account the federal interest of comity between the state and federal
government. District courts should not hear pendent state claims if "state
issues substantially predominate" or if it would avoid unnecessary decisions
5
4
of state law. 1

Had the lower courts initially declined pendent jurisdiction over the MH/
MR Act claims, it would have promoted comity without resort to the eleventh
amendment. The Pennhurst Court supported its decision to bar all state

claims under the eleventh amendment by citing the federal interest in avoiding
the strain on federalism that results from a federal court instructing state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. 146 The Court could
have promoted this interest by limiting the district court's exercise of pendent
jurisdiction over state law claims when such jurisdiction would result in

substantial federal interference in state sovereignty.
With respect to the second alternative, the Court could have dismissed the
entire Pennhurst case under the Burford abstention doctrine. 47 The Burford
doctrine is designed to prevent needless federal interference with sensitive
state policy.' The court of appeals' second decision in the Pennhurst case
illustrates just such interference, indicating that Burford abstention would
have been an appropriate course in this instance.
First, by the court of appeals own reasoning, the federal judiciary retained

scant interest in the Pennhurst case after the Supreme Court's initial review
of the relevant federal law. The Supreme Court all but eliminated the federal
statutory basis for enjoining the Pennhurst defendants by interpreting the
federal Bill of Rights Act narrowly. 149 To avoid nettlesome constitutional

over state claims, because to hear them would require the court to engage in needless, detailed
inquiries); Whalen v. Heinmann, 373 F. Supp. 353 (D. Conn. 1974) (federal court declined
pendent jurisdiction over a claim which had been asserted in mandamus action in state court
and which was presently on appeal).
145. 383 U.S. at 726; see, e.g., Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (federal district court abused its discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction
over claims involving unsettled questions of District of Columbia law); Wilmington Christian
School v. Board of Educ., 545 F. Supp. 440 (D. Del. 1982) (alternative holding) (pendent
jurisdiction should not be exercised to resolve a first impression state constitutional question);
Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F. Supp. 943, 958 (D. Kan. 1981) (court would not exercise
pendent jurisdiction over state law claims where scope of remedies and other substantive issues
remained unresolved); Dulany v. Board of School Comm'rs, 512 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ala. 1981)
(pendent jurisdiction not exercised over state law claims which presented novel question of
whether a state statute created a private cause of action); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Adams, 482 F. Supp. 170 (D. Minn. 1979) (pendent jurisdiction not exercised where
state has regulatory mechanism for resolving controversies under state environmental law).
146. 104 S. Ct. at 911.
147. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Comment, The Scope of Burford, supra note 33, at 996 (Burford abstention
crafted to avert "danger that adjudication of a particular issue in federal court will cause undue
harm to legitimate state policies and federal-state relations").
149. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31 (Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1982), does not create private cause of action to enforce the Bill
of Rights provisions).
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adjudication, the court of appeals resorted to Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act
on remand. Because there was no diversity between the parties, and because
the federal law related to the case had been set aside, the court of appeals
second proceeding in Pennhurst was supported by neither of the traditional
bases for federal jurisdiction: vindicating federal rights5 ° or deciding cases
between diverse parties in a neutral forum.'
Second, the district court injunction substantially disrupted state administration of the Pennhurst facility. The district court's original order called
for closing Pennhurst and directed the transfer of the patients; a special
master was empowered to supervise the transfer decisions.5 2 Even though
the court of appeals reversed the order closing the school, it still ordered
comprehensive procedures for screening patients and determining which
patients should be released to community treatment.'
In short, the lower
federal courts assumed virtually complete control over Pennhurst, even
though the institution had never been adjudged to have violated federal law.
Considering the limited federal interest in deciding the Pennhurst case and
the high level of state interest in administering its own law, the Supreme
Court could have appropriately applied the Burford abstention doctrine to
the Pennhurst case.
The Supreme Court arguably pursued a sensible result in Pennhurst, putting
a stop to federal enforcement of the MH/MR Act in the interest of federalstate comity. The Court was not, however, obliged to turn Pennhurst into
a federal constitutional case to do so. The discretionary doctrines of pendent
jurisdiction and abstention might have been applied in this case, and the
eleventh amendment issues could have been avoided. According to a long
standing doctrine of judicial restraint, the Supreme Court ordinarily avoids
deciding cases on constitutional grounds whenever a non-constitutional ground
for decision presents itself. 5 4 In this case, a decision based on pendent
150. Federal courts may, according to article Ill, be given jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and treaties made,
or which shall be made under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2. Congress authorized
original jurisdiction over federal question cases in 1875. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see C. WRIGHT,
supra note 11, at 90-98 (discussed constitutional power of federal courts to hear federal question cases).
151. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 127-43 (discusses policies underlying diversity jurisdiction
of federal courts).
152. 446 F. Supp. at 1325-26.
153. 612 F.2d at 115.
154. Justice Brandeis observed:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record if there is also present some other ground upon which the case maybe
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Court has followed this principle on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Mills v. Rodgers,
457 U.S. 291, 306 (1982) (Court vacated and remanded court of appeals judgment on federal
due process claims for consideration of state law on right of mental patient to refuse drug
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jurisdiction or on Burford abstention would have been more in line with
this doctrine than the eleventh amendment rationale actually adopted by the
Court. Either of these courses of action would have satisfied the federal
interest in avoiding interference with state administration of state policy.
Had either of these bases been the Court's rule of decision in Pennhurst,

the decision would have left the lower federal courts the discretion to hear
state law claims against state officers when it would serve a federal interest
to do so. For example, a case could conceivably arise in which a state
violated its own statutory procedure in administering a federal-state cooperative welfare program.15 1 In such a case, if there were also substantial

federal claims, the federal courts would have an interest in hearing all of
the claims together because they all relate to the administration of a federally
regulated program. By basing the Pennhurst decision on one of the two
discretionary rules of jurisdiction considered above, the Supreme Court could
have reserved to the federal courts the power to hear state law claims for
injunctive relief against state officers when it would advance federal interests

to do so. In contrast, under Pennhurstthe federal court can never hear state
law claims in private suits against state officials because the eleventh amendment has been construed to pose an absolute barrier to federal jurisdiction
over such claims.
IV.

IMPACT OF THE PENNHURST DECISION

The Pennhurst decision bars private individuals from raising state law
claims for injunctive relief against state officers in federal court regardless
of the federal court's original basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
expressly disapproved of pendent jurisdiction as a basis for extending federal
jurisdiction over state law claims against state officials.' 56 Nor can diversity jurisdiction overcome the restrictions imposed by Pennhurst. At one
time there appeared to be no restriction on a private individual plaintiff

from one state suing a state official of another state on state law claims.' 57
treatment); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-09 (1961) (Court declined to adjudicate due process challenge to state contraceptive laws); Communist Party v. Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
71-72 (1961) (Court declined to address various first amendment challenges to law requiring
registration of subversive organizations); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 211
(1960) (court of appeals judgment on federal due process claims vacated and cause remanded
for consideration of state contract law claims).
155. One example of such a law is the federal-state Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
(AABD), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1385 (1982). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
[now the Department of Health and Human Services] administered federal payments for the
program and issued regulations prescribing maximum time standards within which participating
states had to process applications. States paid benefits to qualified recipients pursuant to their
own regulations. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court heard claims in such
a case against Illinois state administrators; the plaintiff alleged that the state officials violated
the state's own regulations under AABD as well as the federal statutory scheme. Id. at 655-56.
156. 104 S. Ct. at 917-19.
157. In some early Supreme Court cases involving the eleventh amendment, the Court ruled
in favor of private individual plaintiffs suing government officials based on diversity jurisdiction.
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As the Pennhurst decision declared repeatedly, however, the eleventh amendment directly limits the exercise of any form of subject-matter jurisdiction
contemplated under article III;'" by implication, therefore, diversity jurisdiction based on state claims against state officials is barred.
Since the Supreme Court decided Pennhurst, the lower federal courts have
cited the case principally for its main holding that state law claims for
injunctive relief may not be raised against state officers in private federal
suits. 5 9 The federal courts have apparently been sloughing through the

backlog of cases that were filed before Pennhurst and that included state
claims. To dismiss the state claims, the courts have merely recited the
Pennhurst holding without elaboration.16° In suits that raise state claims
against state officials that had been removed from state court, the federal

courts have remanded the state claims rather than dismiss them.' 6'

The Pennhurst decision has not only quickly drawn criticism, 62 but also
has prompted some courts to find exceptions to the Pennhurst holding. The

See, e.g., Johnson v. Larkford, 245 U.S. 541 (1917) (citizens of Massachusetts against bank
commissioner of Oklahoma); Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908) (citizen of Illinois against
dairy and food commissioner of Michigan); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S.
362 (1894) (citizen of New York against railroad commissioner and attorney general of Texas).
The Court has not recently reconsidered this issue.
158. 104 S. Ct. at 907, 917.
159. Id. at 919.
160. For cases in which the court dismissed state law pendent claims citing Pennhurst, see
Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 743 F.2d 963, 968-69 (2d Cir. 1984);
Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1984); Allegheny
County Sanitary Auth. v. United States EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1173-76 (3d Cir. 1984); Woe
v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 339 (1985); Hayward v.
Thompson, 593 F. Supp. 57, 58-59 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Wylie v. Kitchin, 589 F. Supp. 505, 511
(N.D.N.Y. 1984); Everett v. Schramm, 587 F. Supp. 228, 234-35 (D. Del. 1984); Gelber v.
Rozas, 584 F. Supp. 902, 904 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Diotte v. Blum, 585 F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D.N.Y.
1984); Jones v. Singer Career Sys., 584 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1984); David Nursing
Home v. Michigan Dep't of Social Services, 579 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Mich. 1984). Society
for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984), is typical of
these decisions. The district court action in Cuomo preceeded the Pennhurst decision. The case
was factually similar to Pennhurst. A class of developmentally disabled children sued a New
York state school and other state officials, seeking an injunction against institutional conditions that allegedly violated constitutional and statutory standards. The district court approved
an extensive injunctive remedy against the school, but the injunction did not specify which
federal and state laws supported the various components of the injunction. Id. at 1252. The
court of appeals vacated and remanded the injunctive order because it had reason to believe
that some parts of the injunction were shaped by state statutory standards in violation of Pennhurst. Id. at 1248.
161. See, e.g., Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 847 (6th Cir.
1984); David Nursing Home v. Michigan Dep't of Social Serv., 579 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D.
Mich. 1984).
162. See Hayward v. Thompson, 593 F. Supp. 57, 59 n.2 (N.D. Il1. 1984) (district court
criticizes Pennhurst decision); see generally Shapiro, supra note I (criticizes decision for contributing to the expansion of sovereign immunity doctrine under heading of eleventh amendment).
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first exception is an elaboration of the doctrine of ultra vires. 63 Ultra vires
acts are those taken by state officials in the course of their duties without

legal authorization. A plaintiff can overcome a state official's profession of
sovereign immunity by showing that the official's actions lacked any legal
authority. While the Supreme Court cast doubts upon the ultra vires doctrine's continued vitality in Pennhurst,' 6 the lower courts continue to impose
65
liability for ultra vires conduct.
Second, the lower federal courts have sustained pendent state tort claims

against state officials that were filed against the officials in their personal
capacity.166 When an official commits torts privately, not in connection with

the duties of his or her office, the official is not immune from liability
simply by virtue of holding a government title. 167 The official may be sued

as a private individual without confronting the eleventh amendment prohibition. In contrast to ultra vires, where the court investigates the defendant's
fidelity to official responsibility, private tort claims are pled directly against
the defendants as private persons and, at least ostensibly, seek no damages

from the state.

68

163. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 134.
165. Attempts by plaintiffs to characterize state officials' conduct as ultra vires have met
with mixed results. Compare Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. United States EPA, 732
F.2d 1167, 1174 (3d Cir. 1984), and Everett v. Schramm, 587 F. Supp. 228, 235 n.l (D. Del.
1984) (both finding that defendants' activities were not ultra vires) with Miami Univ. Assoc.
Student Gov't v. Shriver, 735 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1984) (school officers lacked legal
authority to enforce "no car" policy on students; Pennhurst does not bar relief to plaintiffs).
See generally Portnoy v. Pennick, 595 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (to prove that
officials' conduct is ultra vires, a plaintiff must prove that they willfully and knowingly violated
their decision-making authority).
166. One such case is Terry v. Burke, 589 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. I11.1984). Ernest Terry filed
an action in federal court against a parole officer, Baxter Burke, in connection with an alleged
battery. 589 F. Supp. at 854. Terry sought damages against Burke under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
Burke's alleged violations of Terry's federal constitutional rights. Terry also joined claims
against Burke in his individual capacity for the state torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment. Burke sought to have the tort claims dismissed, arguing that Pennhurst barred
such claims against state officials. The court rejected Burke's arguments, distinguished Pennhurst, and sustained jurisdiction over the tort claims. Id. at 856. The court found that the
claims were against Burke as a private person; the plaintiff looked for damages only from
Burke, and therefore the suit was not one against the state. Id.; see Portnoy v. Pennick, 595
F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (defamation claims against state employees in their
individual capacities sustained); Morrison v. Lefevre, 592 F. Supp. 1052, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(state tort claims for conversion against prison officials in their individual capacities sustained);
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 82 (predicting that Pennhurst would leave intact the individual tort
liability of state officials as private citizens). But see Gelber v. Rozas, 584 F. Supp. 902, 904
(S.D. Fla. 1984) (state law tort claims against individual defendants barred, because injunction
based upon such claims would operate against the state).
167. See Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 914 n.21 (expressly reaffirms liability of officials as
individuals for their own torts); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 53, at 1059-61 (discussing
officer liability under federal common law).
168. See, e.g., Terry v. Burke, 589 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. I11.1984) (discussed supra at note 166).
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Finally, federal courts may enforce state law against state officials if the
state law has been expressly incorporated in a federal law which otherwise
waives the state's immunity.169 In such cases, the defendant state agencies
received federal money as part of a federal grant program to participate in
a federal-state cooperative program. In some cases, Congress has imposed
conditions upon the use of the money that may require the state to create
and enforce state standards upon the grant program. While those standards
are part of the state law, for the purposes of the grant program they are
also considered part of the federal law. A private plaintiff may therefore
sue state officials to require compliance with state standards related to the
federal law. 7 0
Aside from these exceptions, Pennhurst compels private individual plaintiffs to bring whatever state law claims they may have against state officials
into state court. Young continues to allow private plaintiffs to bring federal
claims against state officials in federal court.' 7' Assuming, however, that a
plaintiff wants to bring federal claims against state officers, and also has
state claims to raise, the Pennhurst decision leaves the plaintiff with three
options: (1) bring both the federal and state claims to state court; (2) split
the claims between federal and state court; and (3) forego the state claims
and bring the federal claims to federal court. Each of these options illustrates
how the Pennhurst decision will, in practice, frustrate the private plaintiff's
access to a federal forum for suits against states.
While bringing the claims together in state court may be the most convenient of the three options to the plaintiff, and may be the only way to
raise all of the claims in one suit, this procedure is contrary to the plaintiff's
ordinary preference of bringing federal claims to federal court. State courts
are not necessarily the institutional equals of federal courts for the purpose
of adjudicating federal claims; state courts may lack experience and famil169. For information regarding congressional statutes which waive the eleventh amendment,
see supra note 62.
170. In Students of Cal. School for The Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538, 545 (9th Cir. 1984),
vacated as moot, 105 S.Ct. 1820 (1985), federal grant money from the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHC), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982), financed the construction of a
school for sightless children. The law required recipient states to maintain free appropriate
public education in the facilities built with the grant money. The statutory definition of "free
appropriate public education" expressly incorporated all state laws and standards for educational
facilities into the federal statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982).
The plaintiff class filed an action in federal court seeking an injunction to block the State
of California from moving the state school from its current Berkeley location to a Fremont site
pending performance of seismic tests on the building which is a standard procedure for all
California public school buildings. 736 F.2d at 540-41. The state officials sought to dismiss the
claim, arguing that the injunction the plaintiffs sought would compel them to conform to state
law standards, and that such federal injunctions were barred by Pennhurst. The court of appeals did not dismiss the claim because the court viewed the state standards as part of the
federal law. Id. at 544-46; see Everett v. Schramm, 587 F. Supp. 228, 235-36 (D. Del. 1984)
(state may be ordered to follow its own standards to update FDC standards of need, implemented
pursuant to the federal grant program).
171. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 909.
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iarity with federal law. 72 In contrast, federal courts are attractive to plaintiffs
because of their expertise in handling federal law. Pennhurst, however, acts
to close federal courthouse doors under this first option, to the detriment
of the plaintiff.
The individual plaintiff's second option, splitting federal and state claims
between the respective courts, entails the greatest inconvenience and risk to
the plaintiff. The expense and burden of trying closely related claims separately may place this alternative beyond the reach of many plaintiffs. Moreover, splitting claims may result in piecemeal litigation and consequently
may delay implementation of remedies for the plaintiff. 73
Furthermore, there is a risk to the plaintiff that a federal district court
would dismiss the federal claims before them, due to the pendency of a
similar state claim in state court. In recent years, federal courts have ordered
such dismissals on the basis of Colorado River.'74 The Court said in Colorado
River that "considerations of [w]ise judicial administration" may justify such
dismissal, but only in "exceptional circumstances.'' 1 "
The Court's general reluctance to embrace ColoradoRiver abstention may
be diminished in cases involving state defendants. Colorado River is an
exceptional doctrine because it requires federal courts to surrender jurisdiction purely on grounds of judicial economy. 76 When a state official is a
defendant, however, a special federal interest in comity is also implicated.
The Burford doctrine instructs federal courts to avoid interference with a
state's administration of its domestic affairs. 77 An injunction issued by the
172. See, e.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (inventory of
the inadequacies of state courts as institutions for interpreting the U.S. Constitution); Stolz,
Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional
Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (1976) (identifying factors that tend to
make federal judges more loyal to Supreme Court judgments than state judges). But see Bater,
The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605 (1981)
(discussion of the "valuable and enriching" role of state courts in federal constitutional
litigation); Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the
Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and FederalCourts, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 175 (1981)
(point-by-point critique of Neuborne's article).
173. The problems inherent in claim splitting are illustrated by the experience with federal
abstention. When a federal case is stayed in favor of state litigation, the resulting delay between
the filing of the suit and a final judgment can be lengthy. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (nine-year delay); United States v. Leiter
Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965) (mooted after twelve-year delay); Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (nine-year delay).
174. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
175. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip.
Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). The Court has recently elaborated on the "exceptional
circumstances" which underlie ColoradoRiver abstention. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); supra notes 43-50.
176. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818 ("the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a
federal suit due to presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial
administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention").
177. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text; cf. Accident Fund v. Baerwaldt, 579 F.
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lower federal courts, such as the one ordered in Pennhurst, may have a
profound impact on state policy.' 78 In cases where a federal court can expedite
both judicial economy and comity by centralizing litigation in a single state
forum, the federal judge will be susceptible to state arguments that federal
claims against state agents ought to be dismissed to permit their adjudication
in one proceeding in state court.
A merger of Burford and Colorado River abstention, therefore, may
produce a doctrine by which a state defendant can seek dismissal of federal
claims against it in federal court. If the facts of the Pennhurst case were
reproduced in a post-Pennhurst case, it is certain that the state law claims
would be relegated to the state court. 7 9 If the plaintiff brought separate
federal claims to federal district court, the state defendant would have two
points in favor of having the federal claims transferred to state court. First,
drawing from Colorado River, the state could argue that piecemeal litigation
could result in inconsistent judgments.' 80 Separate injunctions based upon
state and federal law against the same institution might make irreconcilable
demands upon the defendant. Second, raising Burford, the state would
contend that comity obliges the court to permit the state to administer its
domestic affairs with only the minimum necessary federal interference.
Aside from these two considerations, other factors raised by Moses H.
Cone are neutral in a Pennhurst-like case with respect to the preferred
forum. In Pennhurst, for instance, state and federal law were equally important in the litigation; neither predominated.'"' The state courts are presumably competent forums in which to litigate federal claims,' 8 2 as federal
courts presumably are competent forums in which to litigate state claims.
Finally, in most cases, it would be equally convenient for the whole trial to
be conducted in either federal or state court. Considering all of these factors,
a federal district court has ample justification to dismiss the federal suit in
favor of the state forum.
The third and final option for a private plaintiff after Pennhurst is to

Supp. 724, 727 (W.D. Mich. 1984) ("spirit of nonintervention" in state policy, embraced in
Pennhurst, influences court decision to abstain from case).
178. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.

179. The state claims do not fall under any of the exceptions discussed above. See supra
notes 163-70 and accompanying text. First, the Supreme Court refused in the first instance to

find the state officials' conduct at Pennhurst ultra vires. Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at 908-09 n. I.
Second, the officials could not be sued in their personal capacity in this case, since their
supposed neglect of the Pennhurst facility stemmed from their status as state officials. Id.

Third, apparently neither of the federal statutes applicable to this case, the Rehabilitation Act
and the Bill of Rights Act, incorporate state standards upon state facilities.
180. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1983)
(discussing prospect of avoiding piecemeal litigation by dismissal).
181. At the district court level, the Pennhurst injunction was framed in terms of federal and
state law. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1325-26 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
182. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (state courts are coequals
with federal courts in adjudicating federal law).
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forego state law claims against state officers and to bring only the federal
claims in federal court. This averts the prospect of the federal court dismissing the federal claims under Colorado River because there would be no
concurrent state suit pending on which to base dismissal. This alternative,
however, forces federal courts to decide cases on federal statutory or constitutional grounds which might have been decided on state law grounds.
Such a result is contrary to the doctrine of judicial restraint, which counsels
courts to avoid constitutional issues when there exists a non-federal ground
on which a decision may be based." 3 The rule created by the Pennhurst
Court thus precludes federal courts from implementing state policy through
the equitable enforcement of state law. Although a federal court formerly
could decide pendent state law claims against state defendants, and thereby
avoid federal issues, this practice has been eliminated by Pennhurst.
None of the complications outlined above would have been necessary had
the Supreme Court not drawn the eleventh amendment into Pennhurst. The
Court might have afforded the lower federal courts discretion, under pendent
jurisdiction or abstention, to determine whether to hear state law claims
against state officers. This would have left private individual plaintiffs with
the option of raising pendent state claims against state officers in federal
court, although it might have placed a burden on the plaintiff to justify why
the claims should be heard there. By setting a constitutional bar to such
jurisdiction, the Court has compromised the individual plaintiff's right to
pursue federal claims in federal court.
V.

CONCLUSION

Considered strictly from the private individual plaintiff's perspective, Pennhurst is a barely mitigated disaster. If the plaintiff wants to seek relief
against a state in the future, then the plaintiff will probably have no practical
alternative to bringing the state and federal claims together in one action in
state court. The plaintiff naturally will have reason to doubt that this course
will be satisfactory, but the Court has decreed that this is a cost of living
in a thriving federal polity.
Considering Pennhurst from a loftier jurisprudential perspective, however,
it is not at all apparent that policies of federalism are being promoted by
the Court's eleventh amendment approach to forum allocation. Any benefits
obtained by withholding federal jurisdiction from state law claims against
state officials could just as easily have been satisfied through the rule of

183. The federal courts have often confirmed that pendent state claims should be decided
before federal constitutional claims. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 457
U.S. 594 (1982) (federal court of appeals abused discretion by refusing to resolve pendent state
claim by affirming on constitutional grounds an affirmative action plan for contractors); Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 556 (1974) (if federal court can base decision on federal preemption
grounds, it should do so in preference to determining the constitutional validity of a state law);
Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687, 692 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983) (pendent state claim should be
considered ahead of federal constitutional issues to avoid constitutional adjudication).
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abstention or pendent jurisdiction. Meanwhile, federal courts after Pennhurst
may no longer base their remedies on state law. The full oppressive weight
of federal law must be brought to bear on state defendants before the federal
bench. Surely this is contrary to the counsel of judicial restraint.
Paul W. Mollica

